Pyth DAO Directs All Product Revenue It Receives to PYTH Reserve Purchases

Pyth DAO has approved OP-PIP-136, a standing rule that directs all revenue the DAO receives from Pyth products toward open-market PYTH purchases. Pyth said the first purchases under the policy took place on Sept. 30; its post about the rule appeared on Oct. 8. The governance forum records the proposal as passed.

The 100% figure applies to the DAO’s portion of product revenue, rather than all revenue generated by those products. Pyth says the DAO receives 60% of revenue from products it owns. That share now goes toward the Pyth Reserve, subject to the proposal’s trading and custody conditions. The policy does not alter the underlying revenue split.

A standing authorization replaces repeated approvals

Since December 2025, the DAO had funded its PYTH Reserve through monthly purchases. Each purchase used one third of the DAO’s non-PYTH treasury balance and required a separate governance approval. OP-PIP-136 replaces that recurring process with a continuing authorization and extends the policy to non-PYTH assets the DAO already holds.

That shift changes how the reserve is funded and administered. A standing instruction can connect revenue receipts to purchases without requiring a new decision each month. It also means the policy’s trading limits and custody arrangements become central controls: they shape how the authorization is carried out after revenue reaches the DAO.

The change comes as the previous purchase amounts were declining. Proposal author KemarTiti listed purchases of about 2.75 million PYTH in March, 1.80 million in June, 1.14 million in July and 669,662 in August. Those figures describe monthly purchases under the earlier approach. They do not establish how much PYTH the new revenue rule will purchase in any particular period.

Revenue, conversion and trade limits

The rule covers revenue from Pyth Pro subscriptions, Listing as a Service, the Data Marketplace and Pyth Indices. Pyth reported overall annual recurring revenue of $11.5 million in September, up 86% quarter over quarter. That figure refers to the products and business as a whole; it should not be read as the amount available to the DAO under this policy. The DAO’s share depends on the stated revenue split and the revenue that reaches it.

For revenue received in stablecoins, the Pythian Council Ops Multisig handles conversion into PYTH. The proposal retains a 5% slippage cap and a maximum of $25,000 per trade, and says the council should prefer aggregators. These limits constrain individual transactions, while the standing policy directs the eligible revenue toward purchases. The proposal also bars the council from selling the resulting PYTH, borrowing against it or distributing it.

Payments made directly in PYTH raise a separate accounting question. The proposal does not describe those transfers as open-market purchases. In the September forum discussion, a participant using the name scp asked whether PYTH paid directly by Douro Labs should count as a buyback. A Douro Labs account replied that, for Pyth Pro-related distributions, the company would continue sending the DAO’s share in USDC each month for on-chain conversion into PYTH. That distinction matters: a direct token transfer and a market purchase can add tokens to the reserve through different routes.

Reserve totals and what to track

Pyth’s post gives two figures for the reserve: 41 million PYTH in one passage and 42 million in another. The discrepancy means the post does not provide one consistent total. Mike Cahill, Douro Labs CEO and a core contributor to Pyth Network, described the DAO’s decision to put its entire share into the reserve as “the strongest alignment this network has had.” That is his characterization; the operational details are the revenue allocation, conversion process and limits set out in the policy.

For users and ecosystem participants, the immediate change is a recurring destination for the DAO’s eligible product revenue. The policy’s effect will depend on the amount and form of revenue received, the conversion activity recorded on-chain, and whether the stated limits continue to govern execution. The reserve total and transaction history should make those mechanics observable, while the conflicting totals in Pyth’s post leave its stated balance unclear.

Sources: Pyth’s post on the 100% rule, the OP-PIP-136 governance forum and the proposal discussion.

Related Listen: Why the ‘Regulatory Excuse’ for Tokens Is Ending: Uneasy Money

Unchained